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NOTES
VALIDITY OF STATUTES AUTHORIZING SUIT AGAINST THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF A NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST
A non-resident was riding as a passenger in his own car, which
was being driven with his consent on a Michigan highway, when
an accident occurred. Shortly thereafter, the non-resident owner
died, and defendant was subsequently appointed administratrix
of his estate by an Ohio probate court. Then plaintiff, who had
been a passenger in the other automobile involved in the colli-
sion, instituted an action to recover damages for his injuries.
The action was prosecuted pursuant to a recent amendment to
the Michigan Non-Resident Motorist Statute,' which provides
that in the event of the death of a non-resident owner of an auto-
mobile involved in an accident, the suit may be commenced or
continued against his administrator or executor. Defendant was
served constructively in accordance with the provisions of the
statute. She appeared specially and moved to quash the service
of summons on the ground that a statute providing for substi-
tuted service on a foreign administrator is unconstitutional,
and hence no jurisdiction was acquired over her. (There were
no assets of the estate in Michigan.) The court dismissed the
motion, stating that the statute was valid as a reasonable exer-
cise of the state's police power, but refused to comment upon
what consideration Ohio courts would be bound to accord any
judgment rendered.2
Accidents such as this, in which a non-resident motorist is
killed are not unique. Identical situations have occurred many
times in the past, and will occur even more frequently in the
future as the volume of automobile traffic continues to increase.
Michigan has attempted to aid the prosecution of damage suits
arising from these situations. In so doing, the state has employed
a method which raises an issue under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment with reference to the ability of a
state to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign administrator by
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 256.521 (1948): for reenactment see Mich.
Acts 1949 No. 300, § 403.
2. Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950).
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means of constructive service in an action based upon a claim
against the estate.3 Before consideration of this issue is begun,
it will be helpful to briefly review the developments of the non-
resident motorist statutes leading up to the principal case.
DEVELOPMIENT OF NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES
At the present time, every state has what is commonly kmown
as a non-resident motorist statute.4 A typical example is one
which provides that the operation of a motor vehicle by a non-
resident (or a motor vehicle owned by a non-resident and
operated with his consent by his agent) on the highways of the
state is deemed equivalent to an appointment by the non-resident
of some official of the state upon whom service of process may be
served. This can be done in any action against the owner grow-
ing out of the operation of the motor vehicle on the highways
of the state. Furthermore, the statute provides that such opera-
tion shall be deemed a signification of the owner's agreement
that any such summons which is so served upon him shall be of
the same legal force and validity as if served upon him person-
ally within the state.5 The statute also contains a provision for
giving actual notice of the suit to the non-resident, such as, for
example, by registered mail.6
No sooner had the ordinary non-resident motorist statute
been finally accepted, than it became evident that the situation
3. For the purpose of this discussion, there is no need to differentiate
between an administrator and an executor; henceforth the term adminis-
trator will be used to denote both administrator and executor.
4. For a complete list see the opinion in Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp.
832, 836, 837 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
5. The earlier non-resident motorist statutes provided that the non-
resident must himself appoint an official of the state as his agent upon
whom process could be served in any action arising from the operation
of the vehicle in the state. That type statute was held constitutional in
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). The jurisdictional base for any
action prosecuted under that statute would be consent by the non-resident
to be sued in that manner. The modern statute (as cited in the text)
goes beyond the earlier statute in that the appointment of the agent to
receive service of process is automatically performed without affirmative
action on the part of the non-resident. The validity of this implied appoint-
ment was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). It is to be
noted, though, that the jurisdictional base under this modern statute is not
consent by the non-resident, but rather that when one commits certain acts
in a state, the state, by virtue of its police power, has jurisdiction over him
personally in litigation growing out of these acts.
6. Wuchter v. Pizutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) held that without the provi-
sion for giving actual notice to the non-resident the statute is unconstitu-
tional for the reason that it violates procedural due process requirements.
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arising when the non-resident dies was not provided for in the
statute. Yet the more serious the accident from which an action
might arise, the more likely that the non-resident might die. In
fact, this very situation did arise a number of times. In many
instances an attempt was made to sue (or to continue the suit
against) the foreign administrator of the deceased as defendant
in the action, but these attempts consistently failed.7 However,
dicta in two of the cases indicated that such an action would be
valid if the statute were extended to include it." Prompted by the
comments of those two cases, as well as the pressing need to
make the non-resident motorist statutes more effective, nine
states amended their statutes so as to provide for suing the
foreign administrator in the place of his decedent, the non-resi-
dent.9
Including the principal case, there have been four decisions
involving the new amendments. Three of the decisions 0 have
held that the service upon the foreign administrator was valid,
whereas the fourth"' did not. The cases upholding the service
have been decided primarily on the ground that an irrevocable
agency between the non-resident and a state official was created
7. The courts relied chiefly on three different reasons:
(a) The agency created by the statute was terminated upon the
death of the non-resident. Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E.
751 (1935); Lepse v. Real Estate-Land Trust Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 887,
168 AtI. 858 (C.P. 1933).
(b) The statute must be strictly construed, and since the adminis-
trator is not included, it cannot be extended to him. Downing v.
Schwenk, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 (1940) ; Young v. Potter Title &
Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 AtI. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Vecchione v.
Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N.Y. Supp. 537 (2d Dep't 1936);
State ex rel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934).
(c) The action could not be brought or revived against a foreign
administrator. Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r., 279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W.2d
816 (1939).
8. Young v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 566, 178 AtI.
177, 180 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; State ex Tel. Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 222,
256 N.W. 718, 720 (1934). But see Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div.
661, 291 N.Y. Supp. 537, 539 (2d Dep't 1936). (Dicta there said that
inclusion of the foreign administrator in the statute would be to no avail.)
9. ARK. DIG. STAT. § 1375 (Cum. Supp. 1944); IowA CODE §§ 321.
498-321.499 (1946); MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 106 (Cum. Supp. 1943);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 256.521 (1948); NEB. REV. STAT. c. 54, § 1 (Cum.
Supp. 1949); N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFrIc LAW § 52 and as amended by
c. 719 of the laws of 1945; S.C. ACTS No. 223, § 22 (1949); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 8671 (Williams Supp. 1949); Wis. STAT. § 85.05 (3) (1945).
10. Besides the principal case, the other two were: Oviatt v. Garrison,
205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434,
91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
11. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
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under the authority of the police powers of the state, and such
agency remained binding upon the non-resident's administrator,
instead of terminating upon the death of the non-resident, as it
would have had ordinary principles of the law of agency gov-
erned. Each of the three courts involved refused to comment
upon what effect the foreign administrator's domiciliary state
would be bound to give any judgment rendered.
The fourth case, Knoop v. Anderson,12 which held the service
invalid, did so by invoking the rule which states that a foreign
administrator is immune to suit upon a claim against the estate.
The court said that because of this immunity no jurisdiction could
be acquired over the foreign administrator, and any attempt to
do so would be an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Much weight was given by this court to the fact that the foreign
administrator's domiciliary state would not recognize a judg-
ment rendered against one of its administrators in a foreign
forum.
The issue raised by the new amendments to the non-resident
motorist statutes is one of due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The question
that must be answered is whether the state acquired jurisdiction
over the parties and the cause so that a valid judgment can be
rendered. The answer to the question is at this time one of con-
jecture, since there is no pertinent decision by the United States
Supreme Court. But even though the question admits of no cer-
tain answer, the factors and considerations which the Supreme
Court will likely take into account when the question reaches it
are topics ripe for discussion. The Court in deciding the case will
be confronted with what appears to be an attempt by a state to
send its process outside of the state in order to reach a foreign
administrator who hitherto has been considered immune to
suits which are based upon claims against the estate. Therefore
it is imperative to consider in this note the following: (1) What
is jurisdiction and how can a state acquire it so as to render
a valid judgment; (2) What effect must other states give to
such a valid judgment; (3) What is the foundation and scope of
the immunity rule with respect to foreign administrators; (4)
What policy matters are involved which will influence the Court
in its decision?
12. Ibid.
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JURISDICTION AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The concept of jurisdiction is a branch of the law that is
wrought with innumerable ramifications. However, the scope of
the term "jurisdiction" as used herein will be the definition
adopted by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. That au-
thority defines "jurisdiction as the power of a state to create in-
terests which, under the principles of the common law, will be
recognized as valid in other states. 13 However, that definition
alone is insufficient, for it only states what jurisdiction is. Equally
important is how, when, and in what manner the power can be
invoked by a state. At present there are five bases on which a
state can rest an exercise of jurisdiction over an individual, and
in the absence of all of these, a state lacks the power to create
interests which are binding and conclusive." It is to be noted,
however, that the five bases are not necessarily all inclusive,
and that others can be added by a finding by the United
States Supreme Court that a new base used by a state is not
inconsistent with due process requirements. The result of a
state's acquiring proper jurisdiction, or in other words in-
voking the power to create interests properly, is that
any judgment duly rendered pursuant thereto is valid. 5 The
effect of such valid judgment is that it will be conclusive evi-
13. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42 (1934).
14. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (1934).
(1) The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over
an individual may be based upon any of the following circumstances:
(a) the individual is personally present within the state
(b) he has his domicil within the state
(c) he is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the nation
(d) he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction(e) he has by acts done by him within the state subjected
himself to its jurisdiction.
(2) In the absence of all of these bases of jurisdiction, a state
through its courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over individuals.
15. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74, comment c (1934). The
converse is also true. Any judgment rendered wherein the court did not
have jurisdiction is void even where rendered because it is violative of
due process requiements as laid down by the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker
v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189 (1915). There were early cases indicating that such a judgment was
valid where rendered, but that view can no longer exist in the light of
these later cases.
Compliance with all aspects of procedural due process, such as notice
and opportunity to have a day in court, will in no way cure a lack of juris-
diction. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Wilson v.
Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892); Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 467 (1878).
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dence everywhere of the rights existing between the parties to
the action, for under the full faith and credit clause of the Con-
sitution (with some possible exceptions not here pertinent), the
rule is that every state must give the same force and effect to the
judgment of a court of another state as that judgment enjoyed
in the state wherein it was rendered. 6
Referring back to the principal case and applying the above
enunciated principles, the situation is as follows. The case does
not appear to fit within any of the recognized bases for juris-
diction, yet the Michigan court held that jurisdiction had been
acquired.'7 If defendant should appeal, the issue that will have
to be decided will be whether the amendment to the Michigan
Non-Resident Motorist Statute violates the due process clause
of the Constitution. A decision by the Court upholding the
amendment may open the way for a new base upon which to rest
jurisdiction, or it may only be a step further along the road
begun by Hess v. Pawloskil8 away from the strict territorial doc-
trine of jurisdiction as annouced in Pennoyer v. Neff." In any
event, the Court will be confronted on one side by the rule that
a foreign administrator is immune from suit upon claims against
the estate, and by the fact that the service made is upon a non-
resident who has never been within the state and whose only
connection with the proceedings is through his administration
of the deceased motorist's estate. On the other side will be the
liberality of the Court with respect to due process requirements
in non-resident motorist cases, and various social and policy
factors which are closely related to the increase in automotive
16. E.g., Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Millikin v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); 1 BFAW , CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43.3 (1st ed.
1935).
17. According to the decision in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931), the Michigan judgment is res judicata upon
the question of jurisdiction in the cause even though defendant only put
in a special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction, and defendant's
sole relief is by appeal to the United States Supreme Court. If defendant
fails to appeal and thereby allows the judgment of the Michigan court
to stand, and a trial is had on the merits of the case wherein a judgment
is duly rendered against defendant, that judgment should be valid and
thus entitled to full faith and credit in every state.
18. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The case is recognized as an authority for
the general proposition that a state can not send its process beyond its
territorial limits in acquiring jurisdiction over an individual, but this has
been qualified by later decisions.
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traffic and the resulting danger to the public. The remainder of
this note will be devoted to spelling out more fully those consid-
erations with which the Court will have to contend.
FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR'S IMMUNITY RULE
In the interest of clearly setting forth the status of a foreign
administrator in the eyes of the law today, the discussion will
proceed by answering the following question: Under the now
existing state of the law, can a state having personal service of
process within the state upon a foreign administrator acquire
jurisdiction in an action upon a claim against the estate when
there are no assets of the estate present?20 The most common
method of acquiring jurisdiction is by personal service of pro-
cess upon the party within the territorial limits of the forum2 1
Logically, the same method would appear to be competent when
the party served is a foreign administrator, yet such a result is
not the case. The reason for this is that the person who is an
administrator stands in a peculiar light. He has a dual person-
ality, being a real life "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." He is at the
same time an individual interested in his own personal affairs,
and an administrator interested only in the affairs of his dece-
dent's estate, these two phases of his personality being com-
pletely separate and distinct. When he is acting as an individual,
geographic location has no effect upon him, but when he is acting
as administrator, geographic location has a great deal to do with
him. The, reason for this distinction is that an administrator
derives all of his power and authority under the law of the state,
acting through the probate court which directs the distribution
of the estate .22 That court by itself cannot empower him to act
outside of its territorial limits (which would be the state lines),
but it can restrict him so that he cannot act outside the state.
Therefore, in order for the administrator to act as such outside
the state, two essential elements are needed; (1) the law of the
state of his appointment must not have restricted his activity
solely within his domiciliary state; and (2) the foreign state, in
20. The jurisdictional base of personal service is merely used as a
convenient example. Any of the present known bases (see note 13 supra)
could have been used.
21. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (la) (1934).
22. In re Cowhan's Estate, 220 Mich. 560, 190 N.W. 680 (1922); 3
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 465.2 (1935).
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which he is attempting to act, must be willing to accept him as
an administrator; he must be accepted as an officer of the court
of his appointment even though he is now in a foreign forum.
If either of these two elements is lacking, an administrator
abruptly ceases to be an administrator upon leaving his domi-
ciliary state. He will be a mere individual having no connection
with an estate. The conclusion is therefore obvious that personal
service of process upon him would not be an acquisition of juris-
diction over him as an administrator and would be completely
ineffective for prosecution of a claim against the estate.
One of the two elements needed to empower an administrator
to act as such outside his domiciliary state has consistently been
absent throughout the judicial history of the United States. This
has resulted in an established rule of law which is presently
applied as a matter of routine in our courts, with little, if any,
consideration of the reasons for it. The rule dictates that as ad-
ministrator he is immune to any action, based upon a claim
against the decedent's estate, attempted outside of the domi-
ciliary state in the absence of assets at the situs of the suit.23 An
example of application of this doctrine is the case of Helme v.
Buckelew, 24 which involved an action arising under §1836a of
the New York Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that an
executor or administrator, duly appointed in another state,
could sue or be sued in New York in his representative capacity
just as any non-resident may sue or be sued. In that case, a
foreign administratrix was personally served while in New
York in an action upon a claim against the estate with no assets
23. Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654 (1883); Vaughan v. Northrup, 15
Pet. 1 (U.S. 1841); Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1898);
Monfils v. Haylewood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.2d 673 (1940), cert. denied,
312 U. S. 684 (1941); RESTATEnwNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 512 (1934).
There have been instances where the foreign administrator has attempted
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of a court, but the decisive weight
of authority holds that it cannot be done. Burrows v. Goodman, 50 F.2d
92 (2d Cir. 1931); cert. denied, 284 U.S. 650 (1931); Judy v. Kelly, 11 Ill.
211 (1849); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 285, 193 So. 648(1940) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 513 (1934). Contra: Babbitt
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 651, 63 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1906) ;Newark Saving
Inst. v. Jones, 35 N.J. Eq. 406 (Ch. 1882). However, where the foreign
administrator brings the suit under a statute permitting him to so act,
and a judgment is rendered against him on a counterclaim, that judg-
ment is conclusive, and it would be provable as a claim against the estate
in the domiciliary state. Lackner v. McKechney, 252 Fed. 403 (7th Cir.
1918) ; Palm's Adm'r. v. Howard, 31 Ky. Law 316, 102 S.W. 967 (1907).
24. 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920).
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in the state. The court held that the summons should be vacated,
because the statute failed to terminate her immunity to suit even
though it did remove her disability to sue. In the course of the
opinion, Judge Cardozo stated:
Foreign administrators and executors may be sued in the
same manner as non-residents, but only when the subject
matter subjects them to the jurisdiction; for comity, though
it may enlarge their rights, cannot, unless it is also comity
of the domicile, enlarge their liability. 25
The element that was missing in the Helme case and which was
essential to the successful prosecution of the suit to a valid judg-
ment was approval by the administratrix's domiciliary state of
her acting in her official capacity in New York, a foreign state.
The other element, that of recognition as an administratrix in a
foreign state, was supplied by the New York Code of Civil Pro-
cedure.
Since the reasons for this rule lie wholly in the absence of
either of the two aforementioned elements, the rule holding a
foreign administrator to be immune to suit is thus seen to rest
upon principles of the common law of Conflict of Laws which
are formulated by the courts themselves, and it has not been
thought to be based upon any constitutional prohibition against
entertaining such a suit. Therefore, in order to acquire jurisdic-
tion over a foreign administrator by personal service of process,
there would have to be a reversal of the present common law rule
by the courts. The domiciliary state must consent to his acting
outside of its territorial boundaries, and the foreign state must
recognize him as an official of his domiciliary state. The general
trend today is toward recognition in the foreign states, as evi-
denced by many statutes permitting foreign administrators to
25. Id. at 373, 128 N.E. at 219. Similarly, in McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y.
379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925), a statute providing for the continuance of an in
personam action against a party's administrator in case of death during
the suit was held to violate the due process clause of the Constitution which
precludes the legislature from providing generally for judgments in
personam against the foreign administrator of the decedent. Contra: Dewey
v. Barnhouse, 75 Kan. 214, 88 Pc. 877 (1907); Craig v. Toledo, A.A. &
N.M.R. Co., 3 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 146 (1895). On exact facts and a
similar statute as in Helme v. Buckelew, the courts in these two cases held
that personal service upon a foreign administrator within the territorial
boundaries of the state gave jurisdiction to render a valid judgment, even
in the absence of any res within the state, but both courts refused to com-
ment upon what effect the domiciliary state would have to give the judg-
ment.
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sue and as further evidenced by a number of attempts made to
sue them. Yet this trend by itself is having little, if any, effect
upon the immunity rule, because the domiciliary state is normally
quite adamant in its stand of refusing to allow its administrator
to bind the estate by acts outside of the domiciliary state. The
stand is based upon a desire to keep the administration of the
estate free from interference by foreign courts. But there is no
real need for the domiciliary state to take such a position, for a
judgment against a foreign administrator would not constitute
any such interference. Such judgment would only be conclusive
evidence of a claim existing against the estate, which the domi-
ciliary state would consider along with other valid claims in ac-
cordance with its laws. The judgment would not in itself deprive
the estate of any assets. All administration of the estate would
still be under the exclusive control of the domiciliary state.2-8
It is thus seen that under the present state of the law a foreign
administrator enjoys a great immunity from suit, and the ques-
tion asked at the beginning of this section must be answered in
the negative, even though the states could easily remove the im-
munity. 27 However, for the purpose of this note the law must be
taken as it now stands, which means that if the United States
Supreme Court affirms the Michigan decision the foreign admin-
istrator immunity rule will still stand, but will have had an
exception engrafted. This exception will be that in the situation
provided for in the amendment to the non-resident motorist
statutes, the foreign administrator will no longer enjoy an im-
munity from suits based upon claims against the estate with no
assets present. The fact that this exception would only be carv-
ing a small niche in the wall of immunity around a foreign ad-
ministrator should, to a large extent, lighten the weight that the
immunity rule places on the side of finding the amendment to be
26. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (U.S. 1875).
27. In Evans v. Tatern, 9 S. & R. 252 (Pa. 1823) a Pennsylvania
executrix had been sued in Tennessee upon a claim against her decedent's
estate. She had voluntarily appeared, and a judgment had been rendered
against her. This judgment was then presented as evidence of a valid
claim against the estate in Pennsylvania, and was upheld and given effect
by the court which stated that it could see no reason for any other result.
The Evans case was the only one found giving such a result, but it is
enough to serve as an example of what the situation would be should the
states reverse this present position with regard to foreign administrators
as indicated in the text.
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in violation of the Constitution. Yet even when of a lightened
weight, it is an important consideration which the Supreme
Court will not be able to treat lightly.
LIBERALITY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST CASES
On the other side of the fence, tending to lend weight to the
possibility of the amendment to the non-resident motorist statute
being held consistent with due process requirements, is the fact
that the Supreme Court has taken a liberal view with respect to
non-resident motorist legislation in the past. It was early
decided that a state's power to make regulations regarding its
highways extended to their use by non-residents just as to resi-
dents.28 As was pointed out in the beginning of this note, the
Court had no trouble upholding the early non-resident motorist
statutes in Kane v. New Jersey and Hess v. Paawloski.29 A
strong inducement behind the Supreme Court's decisions in
these cases was the finding of a danger to the public. The opinion
in the Hess case said:
Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when
skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by
serious dangers to persons and property. In the public in-
terest the state may make and enforce regulations reason-
ably calculated to promote care on the part of all residents
and non-residents alike, who use its highways. 0
With today's increased automobile traffic and the attendant
increase in danger to the public, a logical conclusion is that the
Supreme Court will not now retreat from the position of liber-
ality taken in the earlier case. In fact, because of the increased
danger now, as compared with the situation at the time of the
Hess case (i.e., 1927), it is not at all unreasonable to assume
that the Court, in measuring the amendment against due process
requirements, might advance beyond its previous position.
In conjunction with this point of liberality, it is well to observe
that many of the standard non-resident motorist statutes pro-
vide for suit against the non-resident when his agent drives in
the state. The statutes usually provide that service upon the
appointed official of the state with proper notice of the suit to
28. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
29. See note 5 supra.
30. 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
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the non-resident owner will give valid in personam jurisdiction
in an action arising out of the agent's operation of the automo-
bile. This is done with no violation of the due process require-
ments. 31 The Supreme Court could very well hold that suit against
the non-resident's administrator does not place any greater
strain on the due process requirement than in the agency situa-
tion even though the two are far from being analogous.
SOCIAL AND POLICY FACTORS
Whether the Supreme Court will uphold the amendment to the
non-resident motorist statute and thereby place a new mile-
stone along the road begun by the Hess case leading away from
the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff will also depend on various
social and policy factors. One such factor which has already
been introduced is the increased volume of automobile traffic.
This has created a definite danger to the public safety with which
a state, through its police power, should be allowed to cope.
For a state to provide a procedure whereby an injured and inno-
cent plaintiff can prosecute his lawsuit at the situs of the acci-
dent where his witnesses will be more readily available does not
appear to be unreasonable. Undoubtedly it is true that a con-
sideration of convenience alone should never decide grave con-
stitutional issues, but it is equally true that there is no reason
why the matter of convenience can not be considered in arriving
at a decision. As pointed out earlier, allowing the suit to be
brought at the situs of the accident instead of in the domiciliary
state would not interfere with the administration of the estate;
since wherever the plaintiff should sue, any judgment he received
would merely be conclusive evidence of a claim against the estate
which the domiciliary state would administer along with other
valid claims.
Also to be taken into account is that the more serious the acci-
dent, the stronger is the probability that plaintiff will be seriously
injured physically and have his property heavily damaged, and
the stronger is the probability of the non-resident motorist dying.
31. Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N.E.2d 592 (1939) ; Schutt v. Dillavou
234 Iowa 610, 13 N.W.2d 322 (1944) ; Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N.W.
333 (1940); Queen City Coach Co. v. Chattanooga Medicine Co., 220 N.C.
442, 17 S.E.2d 478 (1941); Wynn v. Robinson, 216 N.C. 347, 4 S.E.2d 884(1939). The wording of the statute is very important in this situation,
for the courts in strictly construing it will not extend it to an agent of the
non-resident unless express provision is made for such a result.
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NOTES
The Supreme Court may very well consider the paradoxical situ-
ation that would result should the amendment be found uncon-
stitutional. That situation would be that those plaintiffs who
were fortunate enough to be in an accident in which the non-
resident survived could sue where the accident occurred. Those
plaintiffs who were unfortunate enough to be in an accident
wherein the non-resident was killed or soon died would be forced
to sue in the non-resident's domiciliary state. Yet this latter
situation is the one which involves the most serious accidents
and the greatest danger to the public safety. Such a factor could
well have an effect on the Court's deliberations.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding the fate of the
extension of the non-resident motorist statutes to the adminis-
trator of the non-resident, will be forced to resolve various con-
flicting doctrines of law and various social policies. However, it
is the opinion of this author that the inconsistent factors can be
resolved so as to find that the extension does not violate the re-
quirements of due process as prescribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such a result could be reached primarily by modi-
fying the present effect of some of the factors and would not re-
quire a complete elimination of them. Further, it is felt that the
amendment to the non-resident motorist statutes fills an unde-
sirable hole in the non-resident motorist legislation and that it
gives a result which in most cases is more consistent with justice
and fairness than is the situation without such an amendment.
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